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CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE
EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
IN THE STATES, 1790-1860 WILLIAM

E.

NELSON
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Any complete study of the history of the Supreme Court of the
United States must inevitably raise questions about the origins of the
peculiarly American doctrine of judicial review of legislation. The
first two volumes to appear in the projected eleven-volume History of
the Supreme Court of the United States funded by the Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise 1 are no exception. Both Julius Goebel's Antecedents
and Beginnings to 1801 and Charles Fairman's Reconstruction and
Reunion, 1864-88 are remarkably thorough works of scholarship, and
each contains important material on the topic of judicial review.
The study of early traditions of judicial control over legislation is
a prominent theme in Professor Goebel's opening volume of the Court
history.2 After tracing judicial review back to early English enforcement of provisions in municipal charters prohibiting ordinances contrary to the common law, Goebel discusses at length the 1728 case of
Winthrop v. Lechmere,8 which held that colonial assembles could not
enact laws inconsistent with charter provisions affirming the primacy
of the common law. To the English, for whom colonies were the legal
equivalent of municipal corporations, the decision in Winthrop broke
no new legal ground, but to Americans the case was a disturbing chal1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND
BEGINNINGS TO 1801, By JULIUS GOEBEL, JR.
New York: Macmillan Co., 1971.
Pp. xxv, 864.

$30.00. 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88: PART ONE, By CHARLES FAIRMAN.
New

York: Macmillan Co., 1971. Pp. xx, 1540. $30.00.
t"Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1962, Hamilton
College; LL.B. 1965, New York University; Ph.D. 1971, Harvard University.
Member, New York Bar.

1 The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Fund was established by an Enabling Act
of Congress in 1955 to prepare and publish a history of the Supreme Court. The
appropriation for the Fund came from Holmes' bequest of his residuary estate
(valued at approximately $263,000) to the United States of America twenty years
earlier. See Mumford, Foreword to J. GOEBEL, 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at xi (1971)

[hereinafter cited as

GOEBEL].

2 See GoEBEL, supra note 1, at 50-95, 125-42, 589-92, 704-07, 778-84.

For further
discussions of this idea see id. 109-18 (selective retention of English law after the
Declaration of Independence); 204-36 (the Constitutional Convention Debates);
304-23 (Hamilton's defense of the judiciary in The Federalist); 645-51 (the planned
constitutional attacks on the Sedition Acts).
3 British Privy Council, 1728 (unreported), in 1 J. THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

34 (1895).

See

GOEBEL,

supra note 1, at 73-76.

For a South

Carolina case denying to colonial courts the power to invalidate colonial legislation
contrary to the common law, see Williams v. Watson's Executors, S.C.C.P., Nov.
1759, in J. SMITH, DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 452 (1965).
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lenge to their legislatures' supremacy. Four decades later, however, as
they searched for ways to limit the supremacy of Parliament, Americans
found judicial review more appealing, and they themselves took further
steps toward it, until by the outbreak of the War of Independence "a
distinctly native 4 doctrine of [judicial] control over legislation" had
begun to emerge.

As Americans during the 17 70's and 1780's established their new
governments and framed their new constitutions, the doctrine of judicial review matured and gained increasing acceptance. Goebel discusses
five leading cases in which state courts confronted the issue of judicial
review in the 1780's; ' he concludes that in four of the cases the courts
ruled they had power to invalidate unconstitutional legislation, while
in the fifth a New York court effectively struck down a statute under
the guise of interpretation. There were other cases in Massachusetts "
and New Hampshire,7 holding legislative acts unconstitutional and in
South Carolina narrowly circumscribing some 1787 legislation.' Goebel
maintains, moreover, that judicial review was widely approved both at
the federal constitutional convention and in the state ratifying conventions. He points to numerous statements " arguing or assuming that
the Supreme Court would exercise the power of review and observes
"that the antifederalists, who were quick to pounce on anything that
could be converted into a reproach of the proposed system, [did] not
immediately [join] issue"; 1 his view is that the doctrine of judicial
review was "preached . . . [during the 1780's] apparently without

protest." n
4 GOEBEL, supra note 1, at 93.

5Id. 125-42; Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y.C. Mayor's Ct. 1784), in SELECT
CASES OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF NEv YORK CITY 302 (R. Morris ed. 1935);

Den ex dern. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 Martin 42 (N.C. 1787) ; J. VARNum, THE CASE,
TRvEn AGAINST WEEDEN (1787) (RI.); Cases of the Judges, 8 Va. (4 Call.)
135 (1788) ; Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call.) 5 (1782).
6 On the basis of a 1788 letter from J. B. Cutting to Thomas Jefferson, the
Massachusetts case was initially identified as Brattle v. Hinckley, Supreme Judicial
Court, Worcester, Sept Term, 1786. The court in that case, however, did not hold
a legislative act unconstitutional, and none of the surviving records of the case
indicate whether the court asserted its power of judicial review. See Goodell, An
Early Constitutional Case in Massachusetts, 7 HARv. L. REv. 415 (1894). Professor
Crosskey has accordingly described the Massachusetts case as one "which seems
never to have occurred." 2 W. CRossKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 961-62
(1953) [hereinafter cited as CROSSKEY]. However, in Goddard v. Goddard, Supreme
Judicial Court, Suffolk, Feb. Term, 1789, the highest court of Massachusetts did,
in fact, hold unconstitutional a legislative resolve reinstating a previously decided
action on the court's docket. See generally W. Nelson, The Americanization of the
Common Law During the Revolutionary Era 258 n.72 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Nelson].
7 There were at least two unreported cases in New Hampshire in which the
courts held void legislative acts changing the right to jury trial. These cases are
discussed in CRoss EY, supra note 6, at 968-71.
S Ham v. M'Claws, 1 Bay 93 (S.C. 1789).
9 E.g., GOEBEL, supra note 1, at 209 (statements of Elbridge Gerry of Mass.);
227 (James Wilson of Pa.); 301-02 (Luther Martin of Md.); 313-14 (Alexander
Hamilton of N.Y.); 381 (George Nicholas of Va.); 386 (Patrick Henry of Va.).
:o Id. 331.
31 Id. 338.

1168

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.120:1166

Goebel somewhat overstates his case, however, for while there was
substantial support for judicial review in the 1780's, there was also
substantial opposition. Goebel himself calls attention to some of it.
He takes note, for instance, of the "angry reaction" 12 of some of the
state legislatures whose acts were invalidated, as well as of fears expressed both at the federal convention and during the ratification debates
that a Court possessed of the power of review might become "'by degrees the lawgiver.' " " But Goebel ignores the opposition of many
other men,' 4 most notably James Madison, who wrote that judicial invalidation of legislation would make "the Judiciary Department paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was never intended and can
never be proper." "5 In truth, judicial review was a question for which
the nation as a whole had no final answer in the 1780's; it was, as
James Monroe noted in 1788, an issue "calculated to create heats and
animosities."

1"

Professor Goebel's volume ends immediately before Marbury v.
Madison,'7 the first decision 18 in which the Supreme Court invalidated
an act of Congress, and neither volume discusses Scott v. Sandford,9
the second such decision. But Professor Fairman's volume, which begins with the year 1864, demonstrates that, after the Dred Scott case,
the Court began to strike down congressional legislation with regularity.
Between 1864 and 1873, during the tenure of Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase, the doctrine of judicial review was firmly established, with the
12 Id. 137.

13Id. 238 (quoting John Dickinson in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON299 (M. Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937)). See generally id. 310.
14 See generally CROSSKEY, supra note 6, at 1010-25; G. WooD, THE CREATION
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 302-05, 455 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as

VENTION
OF

WooD].
'1 Madisonds Observations on Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia,
in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 315 (J. Boyd ed. 1952).
16 Letter from James Monroe to James Madison, Nov. 22, 1788, in 1 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE 196 (S. Hamilton ed. 1898).
175 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
18 Fairman counts Marbury as the second such decision. C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88 [PART ONE] 52 n.83 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as
FAIRMAN].
He lists United States v. Yale Todd (1794) as the first case. The
decision in Todd was not reported by Alexander Dallas, the Supreme Court's first
reporter, but was discussed in a note in United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 40, 52 (1851). Goebel does not discuss the case in his volume except in
passing, when he lists some examples of court costs in the Supreme Court. GOEBEL,
supra note 1, at 708.
Charles Warren discusses the case in 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 81-82 (rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited as WARREN].
He
points out that several of the Supreme Court Justices suggested, while sitting as
circuit judges, that the act of Congress involved was unconstitutional. Two of the
opinions of the Justices on circuit are reported in a note to Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.a (1792). When the full Supreme Court finally reviewed the
Act in Todd, it "found it unnecessary to pass upon the constitutionality of the Act,"
because "it held that the construction and theory of the Act adopted . . . [below]
was untenable." WARREN, supra, at 81.
1960 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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Court invalidating federal statutes in at least eight cases,2" including
Hepburn v. Griswold,2 1 the first of the Legal Tender Cases and one of
the more important cases in American constitutional history. The doctrine remained prominent during the next six decades as the Court held
some sixty additional acts of Congress unconstitutional. 2
Taken together, the Goebel and Fairman volumes of the Supreme
Court history therefore indicate that judicial review became an unchallenged dogma of American constitutional law sometime between the
1780's and 1860's. But neither volume even asks the questions of when
and why this development took place. Perhaps those questions are
outside the proper scope of a history of the Court, for the Justices invalidated acts of Congress on only two occasions between 1790 and
1860-in Marbury and in Dred Scott-and accordingly, they have left
historians with little material with which to address the questions.
Nonetheless, the questions are important ones, and answers should be
sought, although in sources other than the Supreme Court's records.
State cases passing upon the validity of state legislation under state
constitutions offer a promising, although not fully complete source.
They suggest that by 1820 the doctrine of judicial review had attained
general acceptance. By then eleven of the original thirteen states were
publishing reports of their cases, and the courts of ten of them had either
invalidated acts of their legislatures or unequivocally asserted their right
to do so. 23 Moreover, all five of the states admitted to the Union be20 FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 1426-34. The decisions were Gordon v. United
States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865) (part of the court of claims statute) ; Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867) (test oath for attorneys) ; Reichart v. Felps,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 160 (1868) (an act to settle land titles); The Alicia, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 571 (1869) (grant of original jurisdiction); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870) (Legal Tender Acts); United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S.
(9 Wall.) 41 (1870) (act relating to internal affairs of the states); Justices v.
Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1870) (act providing for removal and retrial of
state cases tried by juries) ; and United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128
(1872) (part of the Abandoned and Captured Property Act).
Charles Warren lists two other Supreme Court cases during this period in
which congressional legislation was held invalid. C. WARREN, CoNGRESS, THE CoNSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 308-10 (rev. ed. 1935).
These are Collector v.
Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871) (federal income tax statute held not applicable
to state judge), and United States v.Baltimore & O.R.R., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322
(1873) (tax on railroad bonds' interest). Fairman concludes that these cases did
not hold the acts of Congress invalid, but merely that it would be unconstitutional
to apply the acts to the facts then before the Court. FAIRMAN, supra, at 1435-36.
2175 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
22 See C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 304-39.
23 Grimball v. Ross, T. Charlt. 175, 178 (Ga. 1808) (dictum); Whittington v.
Polk, 1 Harr. & J. 236 (Md. 1802) ; Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396 (1814) ; Merrill
v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 (1818) ; State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427 (Sup. Ct. 1802) ;
Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816) ; Dash v. VanKleek, 7 Johns.
477, 492 (N.Y. 1811) (dictum); Jackson v. Griswold, 5 Johns. 139 (N.Y. 1809)
(by implication); Den ex dem. Trustees of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. 58
(1805); Ogden v. Witherspoon, 2 Haywood 404 (N.C. 1802); State v.
2 N.C. 28, 29-30 (1794) (dictum); Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416 (Pa. 1808)
Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799); Austin v. University of Pa.,
1 Yeates 260 (Pa. 1793) ; White v. Kendrick, 1 Brev. 469 (S.C. 1805) ; Lindsay v.
Commissioners, 2 Bay 38, 61-62 (S.C. 1796) (dictum) ; Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Brock.
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tween 1790 and 1815 had accepted judicial review by 1820,24 while the
four states admitted between 1815 and 1819 all accepted the doctrine
in cases published in the first two volumes of their reports.2 5 By 1820,
in short, the principle of judicial review was "well established by the
great mass of opinion, at the bar, on the bench and in the legislative
assemblies of the United States." 26
As they accepted the doctrine, judges and lawyers also articulated
a rationale for it-a rationale that was continually reiterated in opinions
in judicial review cases. The premise of the rationale was a novel
American conception of sovereignty that had developed during the
Revolutionary Era's debates. Americans rejected the traditional British
view that the legislature possessed complete sovereignty and argued
instead that sovereignty lay with the people, 27 who by a constitution
Legislators were mere
delegated limited power to the legislature.2
"servants of the people," 29 and a constitution, "the commission from
& H. 20 (Va. 1793) ; Turner v. Turner, 8 Va. (4 Call.) 234 (1792). See generally
Report of the Committee Upon the Duty of Courts to Refuse to Execute Statutes
in Contravention of the Fundamental Law, 38 N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N PROCEEDINGS
230 (1915). This report not only covers these early state cases, but also surveys
international attitudes at that time on the subject.
Only Connecticut had failed prior to 1820 to accept judicial review, but its
failure stemmed at least in part from the continued use of its colonial charter as a
constitution-a charter which gave extensive powers to the legislature. Only two
cases challenging Connecticut legislation before 1820 on state constitutional grounds
are known. One was Symsbury v. Bidwell, 1 Kirby 444 (Conn. 1785), where it
appears, however, that the court did not invalidate the legislation on modern constitutional grounds. See CROSSKEY, supra note 6, at 961. See also Thorne, Dr.
Bonham's Case, 54 L.Q. Rv. 543 (1938).
The other case was Hamilton v. Hempsted, 3 Day 332, 338 (Conn. 1809), which
refused to invalidate a 1708 grant of a new trial, since the act was "conformable
to the usage and practice of that period; for the general assembly then exercised
extensive judicial power, especially in granting new trials." Connecticut adopted
a new constitution in 1818, and by 1822 had accepted judicial review. See Goshen
v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 221 (1822).
Of course, Connecticut legislation had been subjected to federal constitutional
scrutiny at an early date. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
24 See Enderman v. Ashby, 2 Ky. (Myers) 53 (1801) ; Stidger v. Rogers, 2 Ky.
52 (1801); Syndics of Brooks v. Weyman, 3 Martin 9, 12 (La. 1813) (dictum);
Rutherford v. M'Faddon (Ohio 1807), in OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL DECISIONSPRIOR TO 1823, at 71 (E. Pollack ed. 1952); Bristoe v. Evans, 2 Tenn. 341, 345-46
(1815) (dictum) ; Williams v. Register, 3A Tenn. 213, 217 (1812) (dictum); Dupy
v. Wickwire, 1 Chip. 237, 238-39 (Vt. 1814) (dictum).
(by implication);
25 See Lyon v. State Bank, 1 Stew. 442, 467 (Ala. 1828)
Ward v. Lewis, 1 Stew. 26, 28 (Ala. 1827) (by implication) ; Phoebe v. Jay, 1 111.
(Breese) 207, 210 (1828) (dictum) ; Dawson v. Shaver, 1 Blackf. 204, 206-07
(Ind. 1822) (dictum); Runnels v. State, 1 Miss. (Walker) 146 (1823).
26 Moore v. Houston, 3 S. & R. 167, 178 (Pa. 1817).
27 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803); VanHorne's
Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308, 311 (C.C. Pa. 1795); Grimball v.
Ross, T. Charlt. 175, 176 (Ga. 1808) ; Whittington v. Polk, 1 Harr. & J. 236, 242
(Md. 1802) ; Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 201 (1818) ; State v. Parkhurst,
9 N.J.L. 427, 443 (Sup. Ct. 1802); Cohen v. Hoff, 2 Treadway 657, 658, 3 Brev.
500 (S.C. 1814); Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Brock. & H. 20, 24, 28 (Va. 1793). See
generally WOOD, supra note 14, at 292, 301-04, 454-63, 471-518, 552.
2
s THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 491-94 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
29 Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Brock. & H. 20, 53 (Va. 1793).

1972]

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

It "follow[ed], that
any act in violation of the constitution, or infringing its provisions
must be void, because the legislature, when they step beyond the bounds
assigned them, act without authority, and their doings are no more than
the doings of any other private man." 31 The judiciary, whose duty
was "to expound what the law is," 32 simply "compared[d] the legislative act with the constitution;" since the constitution clearly
"[could not] be adjudged void," the courts had no choice but to dewhence [they] . . . derive[d] their power." "

clare any "act which . . . [was] inconsistent with it . . . [to] be no

law." " For judges to do otherwise would be to violate their oaths 35
and to join with the legislature in violating the constitution. 36 Thus,
judicial declarations of unconstitutionality were unavoidable and did
not "suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power," 37
but only "that the power of the people is superior to both." 3s
The doctrine of judicial review, moreover, was not thought to
authorize courts to "determine upon the equity, necessity, or usefulness
of a law." " No one doubted that courts should ignore considerations
about the wisdom or expediency of a law when passing upon its validity;
to weigh them "would amount to an express interfering with the legislative branch." 40 On the contrary, everyone agreed that courts should
30 Cohen v. Hoff, 2 Treadway 657, 658, 3 Brev. 500, 501 (S.C. 1814) ; accord,

Bristoe v. Evans, 2 Tenn. 341, 346 (1815).
31 Rutherford v. M'Faddon (Ohio 1807), in OHIO UNREPORTED JUDIcIAL DECISIONS-PRIOR TO 1823, at 71, 73 (E. Pollack ed. 1952); accord, State v.
2 N.C. 28, 30 (1794).
32 Kamper

v. Hawkins,

Brock. &H. 20, 78 (Va. 1793); accord, Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cran)
137, 177 (1803); Rutherford v. M'Faddon (Ohio
1807), in OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL DECISIONS-PRIOR TO 1823, at 71, 72 (E.
Pollack ed. 1952).
33Rutherford v. MFaddon (Ohio 1807), in OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL DECISIONS-PRIOR TO 1823, at 71, 73 (E. Pollack ed. 1952). Judges of this period often
saw no difference between interpreting and reconciling two statutes where they
appeared to conflict and reconciling a statute and a constitutional provision. See
Whittington v. Polk, 1 Harr. & J.236, 244 (Md. 1802) ; Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn.
416, 421 (Pa. 1808); Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Brock. & H. 20, 31-32, 38 (Va. 1793);
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 492-93 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
34 Rutherford v. M'Faddon (Ohio 1807), in OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL DECISIONS-PRIOR TO 1823, at 71, 74 (E. Pollack ed. 1952) ; accord, Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); Whittington v. Polk, 1 Harr. & J.236, 242
(Md. 1802); State v. , 2 N.C. 28, 29 (1794); Bristoe v. Evans, 2 Tenn.
341, 346 (1815) ; Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Brock. & H. 20, 30-31 (Va. 1793).
35 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803); State v.
Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427, 445 (Sup. Ct. 1802); Rutherford v. M'Faddon (Ohio
1807), in OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL DECISIONS-PRIOR TO 1823, at 71, 74 (E. Pollack
ed. 1952) ; Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 420 (Pa. 1808).
36 Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Brock. & H. 20, 59-61 (Va. 1793).
T
3 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 492 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); accord,

Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210, 218 (1850); White v. Kendrick, 1 Brev. 469, 473 n.
(S.C. 1805); Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77, 81 (Vt. 1824).

38 J. BAYARD, BRIEF ExPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
123 (2d ed. 1834) ; accord, Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill & Johns. 463, 472 (Md. 1829) ;
Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 201 (1818) ; Den ex dent. Trustees of the Univ.

of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. 58, 86 (1805) ; Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. 59, 74 (1836).
39 Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Brock. & H. 20, 47 (Va. 1793).
40Id.
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decide constitutional cases on the basis of "fixed principles . . .stamped

with the seals of truth and authority." "' Their agreement was merely
a corollary of an established tenet of late eighteenth-century jurisprudence that judges ought not to "pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one," 42 and, although that tenet was slowly
breaking down in the early nineteenth century, 43 men remained convinced until the 182 0's that judges could draw a line between "legal
discretion" and "political discretion," " between the exercise of "judgment" and the "exercise [of] will," 45 and between "declaring what the
law is, and . . .making a new law."

46

Judicial review, as it developed

after the 1780's, was thought, in sum, only to give the people-a single,
cohesive and indivisible body politic-protection against faithless legislators who betrayed the trust placed in them, and not to give judges
authority to make law by resolving disputes between interest groups
into which the people and their legislative representatives were divided.
This conception of judicial review had not matured in the 1780's,
perhaps because it was inconsistent with a reality in which the courts
in several cases took sides upon important social issues of the day that
divided men into opposing political factions. One issue underlying
state-wide political divisions of the 1780's was whether to permit
former Tories to recover their property and their civil rights after the
War of Independence had ended." Legislatures in the 1780's adopted
numerous acts discriminating against the Tories, and in three cases
courts effectively invalidated three such acts; 48 in one of those cases,
at least, the court's decision provoked a stormy legislative response.4 9
A second divisive issue arose out of the economic dislocation of the
post-war years, which had a particularly heavy impact upon debtor elements of society. Throughout the 17 80's debtors sought and often
obtained legislative aid in the form of tax relief, stay laws, and the issuance of paper money,"° and the most controversial of all the judicial
41 Grimball v. Ross, T. Charlt. 175,
42 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

177 (Ga. 1808).
*69.

43 See generally Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of

Ainerican Law, 1780-1820, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AmEmCAN HISTORY 287 (D. Fleming

& B. Bailyn eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Horwitz] ; Nelson, supra note 6, at
149-54, 418-27.
4 United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 620 (No. 16,700) (D.C.D.
Mass. 1808). See also cases cited note 33 supra.
45
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 493 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)
(emphasis in original).
46 Cases of the Judges, 8 Va. (4 Call.) 135, 146 (1788).
47 See M. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION 265-81 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as
JENSEN].

48 Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y.C. Mayor's Ct. 1784), in SELECT CASES OF THE
MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORR Crry 302 (R. Morris ed. 1935); Den ex dent.
Bayard v. Singleton, 1 Martin 42 (N.C. 1787); Ham v. M'Claws, 1 Bay 93 (S.C.
1789).
49 See GOEBEL, supra note 1, at 137; JENSEN, supra note 47. at 272; WooD,
supra note 14, at 458-59.
5o See JENSEN, supra note 47, at 302-26.
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review cases of the decade was Trevett v. Weeden,5 1 holding Rhode
Island's issuance of paper money unconstitutional. Trevett provoked
the legislature into an attempt to impeach the judges, and although that
attempt did not succeed, the electorate accomplished the same result
when at the next election it declined to return all but one of the judges
to office. 5 2
For several decades after 1790, however, state courts did succeed
in leaving to legislatures the resolution of social conflicts among politically organized or identifiable interest groups. One reason is that
during those decades state courts were rarely called upon in constitutional litigation to resolve such conflicts. Many judicial review cases,
for example, were of immediate concern only to the rather small number
of individuals directly involved; they decided no more than the constitutionality either of private acts granting new trials in pending litigation " or of such trivial or parochial matters as the right of a sheriff to
plead his recapture of an escaped debtor as a defense to a suit by a
creditor, 4 the power of the City of Philadelphia to enact a building
code," and the liability of delinquent clerks to certain statutory penalties.5 6 Other cases, while arising out of poltically divisive circumstances, could be disposed of on grounds that were not divisive. A
New Jersey case concerning the right of a United States senator simultaneously to hold the office of county clerk" is a prime example: it
raised an issue concerning which of two political factions would control
an important local office, but the court was able to avoid that issue and
deduce its holding from widely accepted principles of republican government. As a result, the case did not permanently favor one faction over
the other or involve the judiciary in the decision of fundamental social
issues underlying the factional split; it left the factions free to contest
those issues in the legislative and electoral forums. The same was true
of a series of cases in which state legislatures sought to take alleged
property rights from original owners and grant them to others.5 s The
most famous of the taking cases-the Dartmouth College case 59-- grew
51 J. Vtaxux, THE CASE, TRVTETI AGAINST WEEDEN
52 See GOEBEL, supra note 1, at 140-41.

(1787) (R.I.).

53 Hamilton v. Hempsted, 3 Day 332 (Conn. 1809) ; Holden v. James, 11 Mass.
396 (1814); Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 (1818); Dupy v. Wickwire, 1 Chip.
237 (Vt. 1814).
54 Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. 1811).
55 Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799).
56

Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 2 Ky. (Myers) 129 (1802).

57

State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427 (Sup. Ct. 1802).

dem. Robinson
v. Barfield, 6 N.C. 391 (1818); Allen's Adm'r v. Peden, 4 N.C. 442 (1815); Den
ex dent. Trustees of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. 58 (1805) ; Austin v. Trustees
of the Univ. of Pa., 1 Yeates 260 (Pa. 1793) ; Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Bay 38
58 Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816) ; Den ex

(S.C. 1796) ; Williams v. Register, 3A Tenn. 213 (1812).
59Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)

(1819).
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out of a political controversy that had aroused statewide attention,60
but that controversy involved mere questions of patronage and personality unrelated to the legal issues on which the parties argued and the
courts disposed of the case. Since American society as yet was unaware of the significance of the legal issues posed by the taking cases,
and no organized or identifiable groups or parties had yet formed to
urge decision of those issues in any particular way,61 the outcome of the
case seemed nonpolitical. In short, the issue decided in the taking cases
-the scope of state power to seize private property-was not yet a
politically divisive one, but one for which judges could find answers by
reference to broadly shared beliefs about the nature of republican
government.
Another large category of cases in which courts did not reconsider
legislative policy judgments involved judicial review of statutes altering
the composition," jurisdiction," or procedure " of the courts. These
statutes had been passed after a campaign by radical reformers during
the three decades following the Revolution. The purpose of the campaign was to substitute popular for professional control of the legal
system. Nevertheless, the statutes represented a rejection of the radical
demands and a conscious policy decision by legislatures not to change
the legal system fundamentally. 5 When their constitutionality was
later challenged in the courts, there was no opportunity for reconsideration of this policy decision. All the courts could do was affirm it, for
their only options were either to invalidate the statutes and thereby
preserve the legal system without any change or to uphold them and
thereby acquiesce in the legislature's policy of minor but not fundamental change.
There were, of course, some cases after 1790 in which the courts
could have overturned legislation resolving divisive social conflicts between competing political interest groups. But the key fact is that the
courts did not invalidate such legislation before 1830. The relation of
church and state, for example, was a prime cause of political division
in Massachusetts and Virginia in the decades near the turn of the
6oSee Current, The Dartmouth College Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED
THE CONSTITUTION 15 (J. Garraty ed. 1964).
61 See WARREN, supra note 18, at 487-90. See also L. HARTZ, EcoNoMIc POLICY
AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 22-23, 62-64 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as HARTZ].

62 Cohen v. Hoff, 2 Treadway 657, 3 Brev. 500 (S.C. 1814).
63 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Enderman v. Ashby,
2 Ky. (Myers) 53 (1801) ; Syndics of Brooks v. Weyman, 3 Martin 9 (La. 1813) ;
Whittington v. Polk, 1 Harr. & J. 236 (Md. 1802) ; Jackson v. Griswold, 5 Johns.
139 (N.Y. 1809); Rutherford v. M'Faddon (Ohio 1807), in OHIO UNREPORTED
JUDICIAL DECISIONS-PRIOR TO 1823, at 71 (E. Pollack ed. 1952) ; Emerick v. Harris,
1 Binn. 416 (Pa. 1808); White v. Kendrick, 1 Brev. 469 (S.C. 1805); Kamper v.
Hawkins, 1 Brock. & H. 20 (Va. 1793).
64 Mcllvain v. Holmes, 2 Ky. (Myers) 317 (1804) ; Johnson v. Rowland, 2 Ky.
(Myers) 77 (1801); State v.
-,
2 N.C. 28 (1794).
65 See generally R. ELLIs, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS 111-229 (1971).
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century. In both states, legislatures after a decade of debate took steps
in the direction of disestablishment; 66 in both, the courts accepted legislative policy judgments and upheld the constitutionality of the disestablishing acts."' Another social conflict that produced political
66
See H. EcrNoDE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
(1910); P. GOODMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS

(1964)

STATE IN VIRGINIA
OF MASSACHUSETTS

74-151
162-66

[hereinafter cited as GOODMAN].

Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 340 (1817); Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call.)
113 (1804). Adams v. Howe raised an issue, variants of which remain current
today, concerning the power of a legislature to overturn a prior constitutional
decision of a court. Seven years earlier, in Barnes v. First Parish in Falmouth,
6 Mass. 401 (1810), the highest state court had interpreted article 3 of the
Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 which provided
"that the people have a right to invest their legislature with power to authorize
and require, and the legislature shall from time to time authorize and require the
several towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies corporate and politic, and religious
societies, to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the
publick worship of God, and for the support and maintenance of publick protestant
teachers of piety, religion and morality, in all cases where such provision shall not
be made voluntarily." The court had held that the article not only required the
collection of religious taxes from adherents of dissenting sects, but also authorized
their payment only to incorporated congregations. Since few dissenting congregations either desired incorporation or had the political muscle to obtain it on a regular
basis from the legislature, the effect of Barnes was to require dissenters to pay
taxes to support congregations of the established church, which all were duly incorporated. The dissenters, however, were able to obtain temporary control of the
legislature and secure the passage of the Religious Freedom Act of 1811, Mass.
Laws of 1811, ch. 6, which among other things sought to overturn Barnes by
exempting dissenters from taxation and authorizing suits by ministers of unincorporated dissenting congregations to recover taxes which were nonetheless paid by
their parishioners. See generally Nelson, supra note 6, at 246-66.
Adams involved an attempt to collect a tax from a dissenter claiming exemption
under the 1811 Act. The dissenter's claim was met by an argument that the constitution, as previously construed in Barnes, required the collection of taxes from
dissenters, that the legislative exemption from taxation was inconsistent with the
constitution, and that the exemption was therefore void. The court rejected this
argument, distinguishing between constitutional provisions that were "merely directory," conferring power upon the legislature to enact laws, 14 Mass. at 347, and
provisions that placed "restriction[s] upon the legislature." Id. at 346. In the case
of the former, the court held that "[t]he legislature is, in the first instance, the
judge of its own constitutional powers; and it is only when manifest assumption of
authority, or misapprehension of it, shall appear, that the judicial power will refuse
to execute it." Id. at 345. The court concluded that article 3 of the Declaration
of Rights was a "directory" provision and hence that the interpretation given to it
in Barnes did not bar legislative reinterpretation, particularly since the court had
been able in Barnes to look only to the "natural and obvious meaning" of the
constitutional language, whereas the legislature could subsequently investigate and
"'grant . . . further relief in particular cases, which in its discretion it may
consider as deserving relief.'" Id. at 349-50 (quoting Barnes).
The Massachusetts court, however, was not prepared to concede to the legislature similar scope to interpret constitutional provisions restricting legislative power
over the individual rights of citizens. As the Massachusetts court recognized, to
permit a legislature to dilute rights, which have been specified in a constitution in
order to prevent their dilution, would be to subvert the very purpose of a written
constitution and of judicial enforcement of it. See Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71
Mass. (5 Gray) 185, 222 (1855) ; Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 404 (1814).
The Massachusetts cases appear to offer a sound solution to the enduring problem
posed by Adams. It would seem that nearly any legislative attempt to narrow the
scope of constitutional provisions imposing specific restraints on legislative power
for the preservation of individual or minority rights would likely impinge upon those
rights. On the other hand, provisions which confer power upon a legislature or
withhold power not otherwise granted are only indirectly related to the preservation
of specific individual and minority rights. The object of such provisions is to create
a framework of government, the details of which can be elaborated in a variety of
67
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divisions in many states arose from squatters placing improvements
upon land they were wrongfully occupying; 68 when the Tennessee
legislature adopted an act giving squatters the right to recover the
value of their improvements if the true owners sued successfully to
recover the land, the Tennessee courts again accepted the legislature's
resolution of the conflict and upheld the act's constitutionality. 9 State
courts also upheld other potentially sensitive legislation, such as a
Georgia act postponing debt collection suits " and a Pennsylvania act
for regulation of the militia." And, on the federal level, where the
government's conduct of foreign relations had provided the chief impetus to the creation of party division, the courts again sustained a
significant legislative decision-the Embargo Act of 1807.72
Thus, as one surveys the cases between 1790 and 1820 involving
claims that state statutes violated state constitutions or that federal
statutes violated the Federal Constitution, a persistent pattern emerges.
The pattern discloses that courts by 1820 had begun to hold legislation
unconstitutional with some frequency, but that their working understanding of the scope of their constitutional activity was sufficiently
different from ours that, although we term their activity judicial review, we must not lose sight of the difference. Early nineteenthcentury courts, unlike our own, still sought to leave, and in fact succeeded in leaving to legislatures the resolution of conflicts between
organized social interest groups. Once a legislature had resolved a
conflict in a manner having widespread public support, judges would
in practice view the resolution as that of the people at large, even
though one or more organized interest groups continued to oppose it,
and would give it conclusive effect, at least as long as a finding of
inconsistency with the constitution was not plain and unavoidable.
ways consistent with the enjoyment of personal rights. A legislature's exercise of
an ambiguous power, particularly to promote individual rights, thus will often have
no adverse effect upon the personal rights of which courts are special guardians and
can accordingly be viewed by the courts with less suspicion than a legislative attempt
to narrow the scope of a restrictive provision. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 651 n.10 (1966); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148,
152 n.4, 153-54 (1938); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
See generally text accompanying notes 127-40 infra. Thus, while Congress should,
for example, be the principal judge of its own powers under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to expand the scope of the equal protection clause, see Katzenbach
v. Morgan, supra, at 653-56, the courts should scrutinize carefully any congressional
attempt to deprive citizens of equal protection, which the fifth amendment protects
against federal infringement. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
68 See GOODMAN, supra note 66, at 125-27, 155-61.
69 Bristoe v. Evans, 2 Tenn. 341 (1815).

70 Grimball v. Ross, T. Charlt. 175 (Ga. 1808).
71 Moore v. Houston, 3 S. & R. 167 (Pa. 1817).
72 United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614 (No. 16,700) (D.C.D. Mass.
1808). See J. CHARLES, THE ORIGINS OF THE AmEIcAN PARTY SYSTEM 116-18, 122
(1956) ; GOODMAN, supra note 66, at 57; Goodman, The First American Party
System, in THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 74-76 (W. Chambers & W. Burnham
eds. 1967).
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Judges of 1820, that is, unlike judges of today,73 did not see judicial
review as a mechanism for protecting minority rights against majoritarian infringement. Early judicial review rested upon a perception
of political reality that differed sharply from current perceptions.
Judges of the early nineteenth century viewed "the people" as a
politically homogeneous and cohesive body possessing common political
goals and aspirations, not as a congeries of factions and interest groups,
each having its own set of goals and aspirations.7' The concern of
judges in early constitutional cases was with the potentiality of conflict
between legislators and their constituents-with the possibility that
faithless legislators might betray the trust placed in them by the people.
The perceived purpose of judicial review was to protect the people
from such possible betrayals, not to interpose obstacles in the path
of decisions made by the people's agents in due execution of their trust.
Beginning in the 1820's, however, changes in the types of legislation invalidated by the courts and changes in men's conceptions of
law and politics began to transform the nature of judicial review and
to undermine its theoretical basis. Of course, courts continued to invalidate legislation having little political significance and arousing little
political controversy." They also continued to proclaim the traditional
arguments for judicial review developed near the turn of the century.7"
73 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507-08 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969) ; Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and
EmpiricalAnalysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 275, 310-16 (1972).
74 Of course, Americans in the early nineteenth century recognized that factions
often existed in the real world of politics. But, on the whole, they viewed such
factions as aberrations from the ideal polity. See generally R. HOFSTADTER, THE
IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM (1969). See also GOODMAN, supra note 66, at 6-7, 66-67;
Goodman, The First American Party System, in THE AmERICAN PARTY

SYSTEMS,

supra note 72, at 57. Nor did many Americans at the turn of the nineteenth century
discuss judicial review as a mechanism for promoting or protecting the interests of
one of several competing factions; indeed, it may be that no Americans perceived
judicial review in such terms. Although a number of twentieth-century scholars have
argued that some of the Founding Fathers, notably Hamilton, regarded the judiciary
as a check upon factions and a bulwark for the protection of minority rights, see,
e.g., A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND
BENCH, 1887-1895, at 231 (1960) ; F. RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
THE SUPREmE COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955, at 41 (1955); Mason, The FederalistA Split Personality, 57 Amr. HIST. REv. 625, 636-37 (1952), these scholars may be
distorting history in light of twentieth-century constitutional practices. The accuracy
of their views is, in any event, a subject beyond the scope of the current essay and
one meriting full treatment on another occasion.
75 Guy v. Hermance, 5 Cal. 73 (1855)
(act barring injunctions against men
appointed to sell state land) ; Winter v. Jones, 10 Ga. 190 (1851) (act to sell state
lands) ; Field v. People, 3 Ill. 79 (1839) (power of governor to remove secretary
of state); Young v. State Bank, 4 Ind. 301 (1853) (legislature granted new trial
to losing litigant); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326 (1825) (legislature granted new
trial) ; Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill & Johns. 463 (Md. 1829) (legislative requirement
of alimony payments) ; Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185 (1855)
(legislature empowered criminal juries to determine the law) ; Bradshaw v. Rodgers,
20 Johns. 103 (N.Y. 1822) (using land for turnpike without compensation); Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Halloway, 42 Pa. 446 (1862) (act allowing reduced
prison terms for good behavior).
70 See, e.g., Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210, 218 (1850) ; Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill &
Johns. 463, 472 (Md. 1829) ; Morgan v. Buffington, 21 Mo. 549, 554 (1855) ; Bingham
v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445, 446 (1848) ; Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. 59, 74 (1836).

1178

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.120:1166

However, important changes began simultaneously to occur.
One change began around 1830, when courts again started to
strike down legislative acts resolving social conflicts between politically
organized groups. One case concerned the propriety of government
aid to banks. Whether such aid was proper was a most divisive issue
in the 1830's,7 but when the legislature of Tennessee granted aid to
the state bank in the form of special remedies in suits against its defaulting debtors, the state's highest court made no attempt to avoid
reconsidering the legislature's policy judgment; it implicitly rejected
that judgment and invalidated the act. 78 Another divisive social issue
throughout the South around 1830 was whether to impose stricter legal
controls on Negroes, 9 but again, when one state legislature deprived
manumitted slaves of equitable remedies to secure their freedom, the
court ignored the legislature's resolution of the policy conflict and held
the statute unconstitutional.8" Finally, the scope of the eminent domain
power for the first time around 1830 became an issue productive of
political division,8 ' but judges nonetheless continued to declare some
legislative takings invalid.8
The trend toward judicial reevaluation of legislative policy determinations grew during the 1840's and 1850's. Three major issues on
which organized political groups took stands and which sometimes influenced the outcome of elections during those decades concerned the
authority of the states to prohibit the sale, ownership, or consumption
of alcoholic beverages; 8 the wisdom of granting state or municipal aid
to railroads or other public works and appropriating tax money therefor; " and the propriety of giving increased legal protection to property
On all three subjects, courts invalidated
rights of married women.
legislation in a number of cases.88 The relationship of banks and state
77 HARTZ, supra note 61, at 69-79; A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON
90-97 (1945) [hereinafter cited as SCHLESINGER].
78 State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 599 (1831).
79 C. SYDNOR, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN SECTIONALISM- 1819-1848, at
227-29 (1948); see A. TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERMENT 513-19 (1944) [hereinafter cited

as TYLER].

8o Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs, 14 Tenn. 119 (1834).
81 See WARREN, supra note 18, at 29-35.
82 See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344, 500-06

(1829) (opinion of Putnam, J.); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140, 145-46 (N.Y. 1843);

Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 63 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837) (opinion of
Senator Tracy).
83 See HARTZ, supra note 61, at 204-19; TYLER, supra note 79, at 347-50.
84 See HARTZ, supra note 61, at 104-09.
85 See TYLER, supra note 79, at 459-60.
86 Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65 (1857) (erection of state capital); Beebe v.
State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855) (alcoholic beverages); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378
(1856) (alcoholic beverages); Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854) (married
women's rights); Newell v. People ex rel. Phelps, 7 N.Y. 9 (1852) (canals) ;
White v. White, 5 Barb. 474 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) (married women's rights);
Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848) (married women's rights).
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governments also remained a divisive issue,s8 and one upon which one
state court ignored a legislative policy judgment and held unconstitutional a statute permitting incorporation of banks without legislative
approval of individual charters."8 In yet another case, a court entered
the political thicket when it held invalid a pardon to Thomas Dorr, a
leader of a divisive 1842 rebellion that temporarily overthrew the
government of Rhode Island."9
In all such cases, the courts could readily see "that . . . results of
vast moment h[u]ng on . . . [their] decision . . .. " " Even when
they were passing upon the validity of private acts or of other legislation
affecting only a small number of individuals, courts after 1820 were
more aware of the public interest in and general significance of their
decisions. Thus, the Supreme Court of Vermont noted "the interest
which seem[ed] to have been excited in the publick mind" over its
prospective invalidation of a private act releasing a debtor from imprisonment,91 while the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized the
"grave and delicate character . . . [and the importance] as respects
the interests involved, and the results to the community" of a case challenging the constitutionality of a legislative revocation of the state
university's charter. 2 Similarly, the Virginia Court of Appeals observed that a case involving the power of a private corporation to raise
subscriptions was "of great interest as regards the commonwealth and
individual stockholders . . . and on principle . . . [was] deeply interesting to every citizen of the state." 03 In short, courts after 1820 found
themselves in a situation similar to that in which courts of the 1780's
had found themselves: they were being asked to render judgments that
would reopen socially divisive controversies that had tentatively been
settled in a legislative forum.
Meanwhile a second change-this one in legal theory-served to
underscore the political character of judicial review. By 1820 law was
no longer seen as a body of fixed and immutable principles, but as "essentially variable, extending and contracting itself according to the
condition of the nation, accommodating its flexible character to the
manners, habits, and employments of the people"; " law, men now
thought, "must necessarily vary with the varying tempers of ages and
nations." " Moreover, men had come to see that the basis of law was
.supra note 77, at 286-87, 336-39.
88 De Bow v. People, 1 Denio 9 (N.Y. 1845).
89 Opinion of the Supreme Court, 3 R.I. 299 (1854).
"Dorr War," see SCHLESINGER, supra note 77, at 411-17.
90 De Bow v. People, 1 Denio 9, 19 (N.Y. 1845).
87 See SCHLESINGER,

For a discussion of the

91 Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aikens 121, 126 (Vt. 1825).
92 Regents of the Univ. of Md. v. Williams, 9 Gill & Johns. 365, 383 (Md. 1838).
93 Goddin v. Crump, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 120, 150 (1837).
94 Written and Unwritten Systems of Law, in 5 AmElcAx JURIST 29 (1831).
95 3 PORTICO 193 (1817).
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"[g] eneral expediency, public policy" 96 and that when courts changed
or otherwise made law, they were often "governed . . . by ideas of

political expediency." 97 In short, the courts realized by the 1820's
that "[j]ustice is regulated by no certain or fixed standard, so that the
ablest and purest minds might sometimes differ with respect to it." "
They further came to see that constitutions were not fixed and certain,
that a "constitution . . . [often did] not define what . . . [was]

meant" by its various provisions, 9 and that the power of judicial review therefore gave judges a "latitudinarian authority" 100 that was
"great and .

undefined."

They accordingly grew concerned
that decisions invalidating legislative acts would "not be . . . judg.

.

101

ment[s] on what was the pre-existing law of the case, but on what it
is after we shall have so amended and modified it so as to meet our
ideas of justice, policy and wise legislation, by a direct usurpation of
legislative powers."

102

The changes in the types of cases coming to the courts and in the
conception of law thus combined to give judicial review a political cast.
But even with that cast, review of legislation might still have been justified as insurance against the danger that legislators would betray their
trust and violate the constitution, had not a third change occurred.
That change was the increasingly democratic nature of the American
As the syspolitical system before and during the Age of Jackson.'
tem became more democratic, the prospect of legislative betrayal seemed
increasingly remote. In place of conflict and betrayal, courts began
after 1820 to assume that legislators were "in direct communication
with the people, and responsible to them." 104 American courts had
always "conceded that all power is inherent in the people," and the further concession that the "voice" of the people was "heard through the
legislatures" 105 led to a conclusion that legislatures were "representatives of the sovereign power" and were therefore possessed of "the right
96 F. HILLIARD, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW Vi (1835).
97 W. DUANE, THE LAw OF NATIONS, INVESTIGATED IN A POPULAR MANNER 3

(1809).

98 Commonwealth v. M'Closkey, 2 Rawle 369, 374 (Pa. 1830).
99

Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige 45, 49 (N.Y. 1831).
100 Commonwealth v. M'Closkey, 2 Rawle 369, 374 (Pa. 1830).
101 Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365, 382 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1838).
102 Bennett v. Boggs, 3 F. Cas. 221, 228 (No. 1319) (C.C.D.N.J. 1830). For
cases in which courts explicitly took policy into account in deciding constitutional
questions, see Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 520 (1855); Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio
445, 448 (1848) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Halloway, 42 Pa. 446, 449 (1862).
103 On the extension of the franchise and the growth of political machines before
1830, see L. BENSON, THE CONcEPT OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 7-10, 21-28, 33-37
(1965). See generally M. MEYERS, THE JAcKSONIAN PERSuAsioT 238-41, 246-49
(1957); SCHLESINGER, supra note 77, at 343-44; G. VAN DE USEN, THE JAcKSONIAN
ERA (1959).
104 Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216, 235 (1859).
105 Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs, 14 Tenn. 119, 166 (1834).
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to exercise sovereign power," 100 which courts, in turn, ought not
obstruct.
Taken together, these three changes shifted judicial review into a
new context. Courts could no longer conceive of review as the mere
comparison of a legislative act with a fixed constitutional provision-a
comparison involving neither exercise of political discretion nor opposition to the will of the people. Judges now acknowledged that most
constitutional provisions were vague and pliable and that when they
construed them so as to invalidate legislative acts, they often did so in
order to further political, social, or economic doctrines which they endorsed but which the people had rejected in the more democratic legislative process. This new context obviously made judicial review more
difficult to justify, for it made plain the doctrine's anti-democratic
tendencies. The new context compelled men either to propose abandonment of the doctrine or to articulate other values justifying its antidemocratic nature.
Judge Gibson of Pennsylvania advocated the former course in his
1825 dissenting opinion in Eakin v. Raub.'
Gibson recited all the
common arguments. He noted that "repugnance to the constitution is
not always self-evident" and that, since men "seldom . . . think exactly

alike," "conflicts" in interpreting constitutional provisions would be
"inevitable." If the judiciary once entered into considerations of unconstitutionality, he wondered "where shall it stop." For Gibson there
were no clear lines, particularly since review of the constitutionality of
legislation required judges to make what he labelled "political" as distinguished from "civil" or legal determinations. He further argued
that the legislature possessed "pre-eminence" in government; "the
power of the legislature," according to Gibson, is "the power of the
people, and sovereign as far as it extends." Gibson could simply see no
basis for courts to question political decisions made by the people; for
him, judicial review denied "a postulate in the theory of our government, and the very basis of the superstructure, that the people are wise,
virtuous, and competent to manage their own affairs." 108
Ultimately, though, in the 1840's and 1850's, Gibson's views were
rejected, and judges in their opinions began to articulate new justifications for judicial review. One justification was the weight of precedent: by 1860 courts had held legislation unconstitutional in over one
hundred fifty cases. As one state judge observed in 1861, "[t]he right,
and the duty of this Court, to give judgment on the constitutional
power of the Legislature in making statutes, . . . [has been] established by so many elaborated opinions of this Court, and of the Supreme
106 Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 31 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837);
accord, Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198, 206 (1853) ; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y.
378, 411, 475 (1856).
10712 S & R 330, 343 (Pa. 1825).
108 Id. at 346-47, 349-51, 355 (emphasis in the original).
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Court of the United States, and of our sister States, as to make a further discussion or citation of authorities a useless attempt at a display
of learning." 10 9 Courts would "not stop, at [that] late day, to inquire"
into "their duty to declare Acts of the Legislature, repugnant to the
Constitution, void," for while "[t]hese grave questions once elicited
much discussion," 110 the matter now seemed settled; "[t]he right of

courts to declare legislative enactments, in derogation of the constitution, void .

.

.

[had] been too long and steadily exercised in this

country to be now doubted or questioned." "' Indeed, even judge
Gibson felt compelled by 1845 to recant his former views, in part because of the weight of authority favoring judicial review and the ap12
parent acquiescence of the people therein.Y
Gibson also came to favor judicial review "from experience of the
necessity of the case." 11 "Experience [had] prove[d]" to Gibson
that the constitution was "thoughtlessly but habitually violated." 14
Other judges agreed that "[g]reat wrongs may undoubtedly be perpetrated by legislative bodies," 115 which "from mistaken views of
policy" often passed legislation "greatly injurious to the best interests
of the State, or . . . oppressive in its operation on one class of citi-

zens." 116

One New York judge, for example, thought "excessive

legislation . . . [to be] the great legal curse of the age . . . drawing

every thing within its grasp,"

"'i

while California and Indiana judges

found their "statute book[s] . . . replete with crude and unconstitutional legislation" 118 and other "very odious enactment[s]." 119

The difficulty with legislatures was that they were too close to the
people. It was wrong to think that "no harm . . . [could] result
from allowing the people to exercise . . . the law-making power," 120

for it was "easy to imagine" how "[i]nterest or passion, or perhaps
other dubious influences, often mould[ed] legislation." 121 When the
people, for instance, were "smarting under losses from depreciated bank
paper, a feeling might be aroused . .

.

[to] return a majority to the

109 Barnes v. Barnes, 53 N.C. 366, 369 (1861).
-10 Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 204 (1848).
111 Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 482 (1856).
112 Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277, 281 (1845).
113 Id.

114 De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, 20 (1850).
115 People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 243, 254 (1856).
116 Hamilton v. St. Louis County Ct., 15 Mo. 3, 23 (1851).
117 People ex rel. Fountain v. Board of Supervisors, 4 Barb. 64, 72 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1848) (emphasis in the original).
11s People ex rel. Attorney General v. Burbank, 12 Cal. 378, 385 (1859).
119 Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 527 (1855). For other cases in which judges
found legislation ill-considered, see Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rel. Board of
Police, 15 Md. 376, 468, 471, 484-85 (1860) ; Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295, 298-99
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848).
120 Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb. 112, 117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
121 Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 527 (1855).
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legislature which would declare all banks a nuisance, [and] confiscate
their paper and the buildings from which it issued." 122 The people, in
short, often yielded to "hasty and ill-advised zeal" to "unthinking
clamor or partisan importunity," 123 or to erroneous "theories of public
good or public necessity . . .so plausible . . .as to command popular

majorities." 124
It was appropriate, of course, for legislatures to yield to popular
majorities; as Madison wrote in 1833, near the end of his life, "the
vital principle of republican government is the lex najoris partis, the
will of the majority." 125 By the mid-nineteenth century it was axiomatic that the function of politics was "to secure to the majority of the
people that control and influence in every section of the state to which
they are justly entitled." 128 Yet political majoritarianism raised difficulties. Courts well knew that legislatures concerned only with the
interests of the majority would willingly sanction "the sacrifice of individual right" since individual rights were "too remotely connected
with the objects and contests of the masses to attract their attention." 127
Minorities, that is, could not protect themselves in the legislative
process. As one judge explained: 128
[W]hen, in the exercise of proper legislative powers, general laws are enacted, which bear or may bear on the whole
community, if they are unjust and against the spirit of the
constitution, the whole community will be interested to procure their repeal by a voice potential. And that is the great
security for just and fair legislation.
But when individuals are selected from the mass, and
laws are enacted affecting their property, without summons
or notice, at the instigation of an interested party, who is to
stand up for them, thus isolated from the mass, in injury and
injustice, or where are they to seek relief from such acts of
despotic power?
The judge answered his question by granting to minorities a "refuge
. . in the courts, the only secure place for determining conflicting
rights by due course of law," 129 without which refuge minorities would
at 521.
3 Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb. 112, 118 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
124
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 387 (1856).
122 Id.

12

125 Quoted in R. HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 208 (1969).
1261M. MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERsuAsli 252 (1957), quoting N.

Carter

and W. Stone (reporters), REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CoNVENTiox OF 1821: ASSEMBLED FOR THE PURPOSE OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

127 De Chastelltux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, 20 (1850).
128 Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 268 (1851)

129 Id.

(Coulter, J.).
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"stand in no better attitude, irrespective of the fundamental principles
and maxims of free government, than that of the most abject slaves to
the majority." 130 Indeed, courts feared that, "if the rights of minorities
. . .[were] not observed, it . . . [would] not be long before the
majorities . . . [themselves would] be in bondage." 131

By the 1850's, the courts had articulated a new theoretical justification for judicial enforcement of constitutional safeguards. Judges
viewed themselves as exercising their "conservative power" 132 in order
to protect the "vital principles" of "free republican governments." 133
They believed judicial review was necessary to place "the broad shield
of the law over an innocent man .

.

. entitled to its protection," 134

"'To THE END IT MAY BE A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS AND NOT OF
MEN.' "1.

Indeed, judicial review was needed to protect "that

great idea" on which the nation had been founded-the idea of
"liberty regulated by law." 136 Most important, judicial review was
needed "to secure to weak and unpopular minorities and individuals,
equal rights with the majority," 137 "to prevent majorities in times of
high political excitement from passing partial laws," 18 and to protect
"minorities against the caprices, recklessness, or prejudices of majorities." 19 Or, as one Viriginia judge had summarized the theory as
early as 1837: 140
It must be admitted that at the institution of civil government
founded on the rights of all, the will of the majority must prevail over the opinions and interests of the minority: but when
such government is established, its great object is to protect
the rights of the minority from the tyranny of the majority; a
tyranny more inflexible and implacable than the tyranny of a
single despot.

.

.

.

To effect this relief against the tyranny

of majorities, written constitutions were devised by the
American people.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, in short, judicial review
had become reestablished in the state courts on a new basis-the basis
130 People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 243, 266 (1856).
131 Griffith v. Commissioners, 20 Ohio 609, 623 (1851)
132

(emphasis in the original).

De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, 20 (1850).

133 Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 390 (1856).
134 Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185, 232 (1855).
13 5
Id. at 233.
136 Bradley v. Baxter, 15 Barb. 122, 126 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853).
137 Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. 554, 557 (1831).
138 Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. 59, 71 (1836).
139 Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb. 112, 119 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851) ; accord, Ex parte
Martin, 13 Ark. 198, 207 (1853).
140 Goddin v. Crump, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 120, 151 (1837).
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on which it would function in Dred Scott,141 in the Legal Tender Cases,
and in numerous twentieth century cases. It had become a means for
interest groups lacking control of the legislative process to obtain reconsideration of the legislature's decisions and overturn the legislature's
political judgments. It had become a vehicle through which judges
could impose their own views of proper economic and social policy on
the nation at large and keep the nation loyal to what they thought were
the fundamental precepts of American life. Contrary to its original
conception, judicial review had become a mechanism for the courts "to
protect the people against themselves." 142
341 The minority that the court protected in Dred Scott was, of course, the
South as a region, which after 1850 had lost all hope of controlling the federal
legislature without the aid of Northern, potentially anti-slavery legislators.
142 Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 527 (1855).
The court in Beebe was in fact
concerned lest such a result should occur.

